

**01515**

**1992/03/13**

(E0055)

3/12/92 : Language NEA's Libby Ward Prepared for  
DAS Schaeffer's Hearing Today before Cong. Hamilton's  
Subcommittee

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date: 1/27/93

Classified to: PM/PRO-3 Tom Praster for A/S Clarke's  
EO Citations 3/13/92 JEC Testimony

( ) CLASSIFY as

TS

Q. What are we doing to ensure that China is not assisting  
Iran with the development of nuclear weapons?

A. We have long had concerns about Iran's nuclear intentions.  
As a result, the US engages in no nuclear cooperation with  
Iran and we have urged other nuclear suppliers, including  
China, to adopt a similar policy.

o U/S Bartholomew delivered this message to Chinese Vice  
Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu while in Beijing in June 1991.  
Secretary Baker conveyed this message during his visit to  
Beijing last November, and, just this week, Under Secretary  
Kanter stressed our concerns to visiting PRC Vice Foreign  
Minister Liu Huaqiu.

o We have been aware for some time that China engages in  
nuclear cooperation with Iran. We cannot comment publicly  
on this cooperation, as any detailed discussion of it would  
require the use of intelligence information.

-- China has announced that it has transferred to Iran an  
electromagnetic separator for isotope production and a  
small nuclear research reactor.

-- China's nuclear assistance projects in Iran have  
credible civilian applications, but could over time  
provide Iran with the experience needed to support  
weapons development.

o We note that an IAEA team, during its recent visit to Iran,  
inspected some Chinese-origin equipment and facilities and  
determined that they were being used for peaceful  
purposes. The IAEA Team's findings do not, however, allay  
our long-term concerns regarding Iran's nuclear intentions.

o *Insert A* PRC nuclear assistance to Iran does not necessarily violate  
China's NPT obligations. Given concerns about Tehran's  
ambitions, however, we will continue to remind China that  
engaging in any form of nuclear cooperation with Iran,  
whether under safeguards or not is, in our view, highly  
imprudent. *and other supplies*

o We will also remind them that any form of nuclear  
cooperation with Iran, including cooperation that is  
appropriate for a legitimate, peaceful nuclear program,  
would likely be perceived as contributing to a nuclear  
weapons capability. This perception would hinder our  
efforts to promote nuclear nonproliferation in this  
volatile region.